Showing posts with label Amazon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Amazon. Show all posts
Tuesday, November 20, 2012

Amazon & Google Agree to Antitrust Consent Decrees

2018 Publishing Predictions

My 2013 predictions mainly concern the year 2018. Why?  It's easy to predict the near term (unless you are trying to accurately predict where the markets will go over the course of one year).  Also, the practical utility of a short term prediction is limited.  When the air raid siren has sounded, it's too late to build a shelter.  Predicting the mid term allows time to adjust behaviors and positions.  And, as a celebrity seer once said to me, "If you engage in fortune telling, foretell the mid-term.  That gives them time to forget your inaccurate or mistaken predictions."   His other advice was to "predict outcomes not details."  On that one, I've broken with accepted prophetic practice. 


[Suggested musical accompaniment:  Robert Plant & Alison Kraus' version of the late great Allen Toussaint's Fortune Teller.  Video embedded at end of post.]


Prediction 1


FTC Cuts Amazon & Google Down to Size

(New York) November 22, 2018.  The FTC concerned about
Depiction of FTC Attack on Google
vertical integration (control of content production and distribution) will prohibit Amazon and Google from having a monetary interest in content they distribute or display.  Amazon and Google will agree to consent decrees, whereby Amazon* is forced to spin off its Simon & Schuster, Avalon, Dorchester, Sony Records and Showtime divisions.  Likewise, in response to accusations it abused its market power, i.e. the ability to control price or reduce competition, in internet searches,   Google will agree to divest its Google Maps, JK Lasser Tax Institute, Automobile Club of America, Zagat and ESPN divisions. In a complicated formula to be worked out by FTC and European regulators, within 90 days of the decree, Google will be ordered to start sharing proceeds of revenues derived from sale of personal data of users who click a new "Monetize Me"  button.  Neither Google nor United Parcel Service (UPS)  will be willing to comment on how the  consent decrees will impact their proposed merger.  Lloyd Jassin will be quoted as saying, "Privacy is the new copyright."


"Protecting competition in the digital marketplace is a high priority for the FTC," will say Bureau of Competition Director Richard Feinstein. "This order will ensure that vigorous competition continues in the worldwide online market for entertainment and information products, and that consumers are not faced with reduced innovation as a result of digital favoritism and dwindling access to markets for independent publishers and other independent content producers." 


"The Internet is better served with less regulation," David Crane, a Google-friendly legal scholar will be quoted as saying. "This violates nearly every tenet of laissez faire capitalism.   What Google is doing is good business.  It's not exclusionary.  While Google is invaluable, it's not essential.  Stop complaining about your inability to compete. Start competing."   

*Why the FTC Took Amazon & Google Apart: An Antitrust Analysis: By 2016, the FTC determined that Amazon and Google had turned their backs on their original missions of openness and innovation. The platforms, via exclusionary tactics, have  become toxic to healthy innovation. Responding to real or perceived external threats, both companies had abused their market power by raising barriers to entry,  making it difficult for potential new entrants as well as large companies to compete.   It started in earnest in June 2012, when Amazon Publishing acquired category publishers Avalon and Dorchester. Four years later, Forrester Research reported that 70% of America's online shoppers began their search for a product at Amazon. Google which tied search to advertising, controlled 70% of America's advertising sales by 2016, and was rumored to be in talks with UPS about a possible merger. That same year, the EU fined Google $500M Euros for cooking search results, i.e., favoring its own content over the content of others. Book publishers and more so, film and television studios and the interactive gaming industry had become a threat to Amazon. They could withhold products, or, in the case of studios and the interactive gaming industry, increase license fees at the end of a license term. Google, now a mature business, simply lost its way. The FTC determined it was time to regulate the platforms. But they needed to make their case.  Amazon had shown an unsavory willingness to withhold technological innovations from suppliers and vendors for its own advantage. Using its position of dominance, it often disabled "buy now" and "buy" buttons to address threats from its publishing suppliers. But, it wasn't just about books. Similar tactics were used to punish suppliers and deny threats to entry in gaming, music, publishing, motion pictures, kitchenware, infant diapers and formula, and shoes. Hoping to mimic the trading template created by Amazon, Google eyed UPS as a way to fill in the gaps in creating a fully integrated trading company. Amazon and Google's entrepreneurial audacity were tolerated until they exhibited parallel habits of willful exclusion of others - otherwise known as conscious parallelism in the rubric of antitrust law. After being scrutinized for possible antitrust violations for several years, the FTC determined that they ceased to be the instruments  of innovation; so the FTC cut them down to size. Reflecting on the Apple "Agency Pricing" consent decrees of 2012 - 2013, a former Justice Department attorney (anonymously) observed that "Price fixing cases were easy to sell, both politically and as a coherent story. There were clear villains. Apple. Big publishing. The consumer felt it in their wallets. The price of eBooks went up. When former innovators go bad, those are the tough cases. When do you bring an enforcement action? It's a matter of timing. The FTC waited until they believed innovation and openness had taken a back seat to discriminatory practices."

Prediction 2 
 
Google Wins Fair Use Battle *

If you are looking for something short-term, something 2013'ish, I predict that Google wins (or The Authors Guild settles) the fair use litigation commenced in 2005; that Google does not seek attorney fees or otherwise act punitively.  Is the mass digitization of  books a good thing?  Yes, unless Google favors its own content over yours.  See, 2018 predictions above. 

*Update: Yep, it came to pass.  On October 16, 2015 the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a 2013 lower court ruling that Google’s library book scanning project was protected by fair use and was not copyright infringement.


Resources 

Looking Back on My 2008 Predictions (blog post) (Lloyd Jassin):  I urge you to to look at the end of the post, where I score my 2008 predictions.  The growth of the independent book sector, which was predicted, as well as Google's search engine preference for its own content, are just two or four major predictions that have become reality.    



Three Versions of Fortune Teller

 








Sunday, November 18, 2012

Looking Back: My 2008 Publishing Predictions

Amazon Changes the Digital Landscape

Published in the Summer 2008 issue of
 The Center for Independent Publishing newsletter
 

Recently, the industry was shaken by an announcement by Amazon that the company was changing its order fulfillment policy. In a nutshell, Amazon threatened to disable a book's "Buy Now" button if that book's publishing company did not subscribe to Book Surge Print, an Amazon owned print-on-demand (POD) printing service. Many called it a blatant attempt at a monopoly, because Book Surge is the only POD option available if one wishes to sell books through Amazon using its "Buy Now" button.

As the market evolves and embraces digital distribution options, we at the Center for Independent Publishing (CIP) find Amazon's move both troubling and exciting. Amazon wants to be active all the way along the digital supply chain from production to marketing to distribution. By force of will its Book Surge gambit will make Amazon the de facto virtual digital warehouse for hundreds of thousands of digital book files. What role will Amazon play in helping (or hindering) our members to make better use of their digital assets?

It strikes me that from Amazon's large and powerful river might flow not just POD books, but e-books, books disaggregated and re-purposed for mobile hand held devices, audiobooks and other digital derivatives -- whether now known or hereinafter invented. Our hope is that in the swirl of that digital river, we will see new digital revenue streams emerge for smaller and independent presses. If Amazon remains committed to the indie press segment, and acts as a bridge not just between publishers and traditional readers, but between publishers and digital readers, it becomes an enabler, and, perhaps, the best friend an indie publisher could have. However, Amazon's favoritism to Book Surge is a slippery slope that could easily decrease diversity. Amazon is steering consumers to books that are produced by its owned-and-operated press.

While it doesn't look like the cost of gaining access to the number one online bookstore has gone up (except for duplication costs associated with files formerly entrusted to other POD printers), the CIP is concerned about Amazon’s monopolistic intentions. The company’s claim that it is not seeking exclusivity (i.e., requiring POD titles be printed exclusively through Book Surge), seems to be a subtle bit of specious reasoning. Amazon's gain is the ability to monopolize the POD market. It is offering a single printer option. Just as Amazon deserves our praise for having been a good publishing partner for our publisher members, it deserves our scrutiny as it moves from online bookstore to what is beginning to look suspiciously like a celestial publishing house.

Traditionally, bookselling was separated from publishing, with booksellers (including Amazon) realizing the benefit of combining the wares of many publishers. Now that Amazon has the ability to perform all of the activities that take place between delivery of an edited manuscript and delivery of finished books to readers, the publishing industry needs to take a hard look at its current business model. Publishers have the potential to get squeezed on both ends. For example, there is the Barnes & Noble - Sterling combo with an increasing number of book sales being titles self-published by B&N. It is the same deal with Amazon, which is actively going after new product to self-publish with Createspace as well as original audiobook projects from Audible. To the extent publishers covet virtual shelf space at Amazon (with one-click ordering), Amazon's move should give indie publishers pause.

What if this virtuous publishing partner determines that it is profoundly profitable to publish their own books? If Amazon does not use its great size and ability to bring its own books to the attention of readers, we will be very surprised. When Amazon does this, we fear it will be at the expense of independent publishers whose distinctive personalities are reflected in the books they publish. To date, Amazon has been a good partner, but operating under the aegis of a publicly traded company who has shown the ability to act arbitrarily is disconcerting to the CIP and our publisher members. Publishing is a competitive business. It is likely to become more competitive if Amazon starts favoring its own self-published books

So, as a general proposition, vertical integration is a bad thing. Perhaps, the market will correct itself, as publishers move over to www.barnesandnoble.com, and other digital asset distributors and e-retailers pop up. Likely, that won't happen. Book distribution is not sexy enough, and Amazon is like the slightly abusive partner we tend to tolerate for the benefit of the kids. If the industry doesn't get an order of protection from the Justice Department, then perhaps we need a Plan B.

Physical distribution of books is largely the preserve of large conglomerate publishers and a handful of large independent distributors. It’s not a pretty business. It employs the equivalent of Yankee peddlers who hand-sell books to brick and mortar stores, with full return privileges for oversold books. If we extrapolate, the Book Surge gambit may be seen as a relatively painless first step in managing the digital distribution of titles to e-tailers and licensees. Amazon has the amazing ability to manage and organize content. It also offers a painless online experience for the consumer. Instead of Amazon merely being the recipient of digital assets, it’s easy to imagine Amazon providing comprehensive consultancy services to our members, helping them prepare their content for digital distribution for and beyond the traditional Amazon platform. Is the Book Surge gambit a disguised opportunity for indie publishers? Perhaps. Indie publishes are the small furry mammals scurrying around the legs of large dinosaur publishers. The digital meteor has hit. To survive, indie publishers need to be able to present content in a variety of digital formats. Is Amazon a friend or a foe? Only time will tell.

If I had to guess, I'd say in the next 24-months Google buys Ingram (Googlegram?) for its digital group assets (including Lightning Source), and it out-Amazons Amazon by creating the ultimate digital warehouse/distributor in the sky.

If Google were to exhibit digital favoritism, it would steer book buyers to its wholly owned and super- efficient Lightning Source imprint. Amazon owns the online store. Google owns the web. Amazon merchandises books. Google sells them contextually. Balance is restored to the planet.

The short- to mid-term changes in trade publishing are going to be dramatic. Large publisher dominance is shrinking in the new media economy. When the change comes, we believe the main winners will be independent publishers. They music industry taught us that. Amazon has confirmed it.

Lloyd J. Jassin
Chair, Executive Committee
Center for Independent Publishing

Postscript / Scorecard

Welcome to 2016! Glad you could make it.


It's time to assess my fortune telling abilities. So, how did I do in predicting the future of publishing? As predicted, Amazon's was the catalyst for profound changes in the publishing industry.  

These are the five publishing predictions I made in 2008: 


Prediction No. 1: Amazon acquires book publishing companies.
Verdict: Correct. In 2012 Amazon acquired Avalon and Dorchester.

Prediction No. 2: Google skews search results to favor its own content.

Verdict: Correct. As of this writing (late 2017), Google is appealing a record €2.4bn (£2.2bn)fine levied by the EU over search engine results


Prediction No. 3: Amazon will crush the competition. 
Verdict: Correct. In 2015 Amazon controlled 74% of the eBook market. 
Prediction No. 4: Google Acquires the Ingram Content Group.
Verdict: Okay, not yet. Give it time.

Prediction No. 5: The big winner will be independent book publishing. 
Verdict: Correct. "[N]on-traditionally-published books now make up nearly 60% of all Kindle ebooks purchased in the US, and take in 40% of all consumer dollars spent on those ebooks," according to a 2015 report by the AAP (Assoc. of American Publishers).
Thursday, November 10, 2011

Amazon’s Lending Library Liability

Was “Freeloading” Contemplated by Contract?

In September, I wrote, "It comes as no surprise that Amazon is exploring a Netflix-like subscription service for digital book.  But what might Amazon's subscription book service actually look like for subscribers, authors and publishers?" 
 
Amazon's Lending Library answers my question.  It looks a lot like free. 

While the lesson is not yet clear, free is clearly a problem for publishers – especially when offered by a legal consumer-retailer like Amazon.  Actually, free is even more of a problem when offered by Amazon, since, they are the very model of efficiency and customer convenience.  When paying Amazon becomes optional, eBook consumption increases, but, the perceived value of the book (in all formats) drops. 

From published reports, Amazon didn't pretend to negotiate terms with publishers.  They simply forged ahead with a free eBook subscription program.  If true, Amazon has legal grief to pay.  

Amazon vs. Publisher’s Rights

Two separate legal issues: 

While copyright and publishing contracts may seem like chains that clank and confine us, they secure for rights holders the right to say no.  If publishers had trouble with Amazon’s “We Won’t Be Undersold” eBook pricing, Amazon had to know “free” would be an even tougher sell.  For all the criticism publishers must endure, they are the custodians of our print culture.  And, they have contracts to prove it. 

Amazon is a digital licensee, not a traditional retailer of books.    Unless Amazon specifically – in a gentlemanly manner –secured rights to give away free eBooks, my bet is that the publishing houses win. If Amazon wants to give away a bound book, that transaction poses no copyright issues. Giving away a free eBook does.  It’s the difference between a “sale” and a “license” for purposes of the First Sale Doctrine and the Copyright Act.   Giving away an eBook is not analogous to giving away a physical copy of a book.  Let’s build on that.  Selling or giving away an eBook is not analogous to selling or giving away a physical copy of a book. The latter poses serious copyright issues.

The impulse to give away eBooks for free is clearly understandable.  Retail sales are nice, but free is what sells devices.  Publishing is a niche business.  Amazon isn't.  Amazon's objective is device lock in.  As such, they have no problem with cannibalizing eBook sales to increase mobile device sales.  Free gives Amazon greater exposure, and makes them better positioned to win the coming tablet wars.  Amazon is willing to trade eBook sales for subscribers.  eBooks are cheap fuel. 

Several years ago the Authors Guild and the AAP brought suit against Google to wrestle back control of books Google scanned without permission.  Google made a colorable (i.e., plausible) argument that digitizing for indexing purposes fell under the Fair Use Doctrine of the Copyright Act.  Did Google exceed what was allowed under the Copyright Act?   The jury is still out.  Did Amazon exceed what was allowed under their digital books distribution or participation agreements?   The jury has not yet convened.  But, if Amazon exceeded the scope of their agreements with publishers, their breach, sounds in copyright, not contract.  If you exceed the scope of a license, you infringe the underlying copyright.  The damages can be significant.  

It’s worth pointing out that the Google Book Settlement contemplated an institutional subscription service.  The business model was broadly sketched for purposes of the settlement, but, the details were left  to further negotiation.

Agent-Author Concerns

Moving to the subject of author contracts, normally, if a retailer wishes to give away books for free -- or sell them at a deep discount -- the author takes a hit on royalties.  High-discount wholesale sales to powerful retailers, who, then slash the price of books sold to their customers, results in reduced royalties for authors under the shared pain theory of royalty agreements.  While deep discount clauses can be ameliorated by a good agent or attorney, they are a harsh fact of life for authors.  As Amazon’s “fix” is to treat each free download as a sale, here, the author is not being squeezed by the deep discount clause lurking in their author-publisher agreement.       
What to Do?

So, when Rachel Deahl at Publishers Weekly called me yesterday and asked “Could Amazon’s lending library end in court?” I said “Yup.”  Should Amazon be hauled off to copyright jail?  Nah.  A slap on the wrist should do (for now).  

The white hot issue right now is legal liability.  However, instead of getting inflamed, we need to negotiate a definition of “Subscription Revenue” that works for Amazon, publishers, authors – and their respective attorneys.  Once we accomplish that, we will then need to retrofit 70-years of publishing agreements. Perhaps, the lesson learned is we are shackled to one another by contract and copyright.

Next Great eBook Debate

Welcome to next great eBook debate. It’s not about territorial rights, or talking eBooks, or e-Book pricing. It’s about how to define the term Subscription Revenue.


Subscription book services are on the march. They make sense for both publishers and readers for reasons discussed in an earlier post.  However, a payment based on subscription revenue is a complex formula.  What trickles down to the author, ultimately, will be defined by both the “Subscription Revenue” definition hacked out between Amazon and publishers, and, in many cases, pre-internet author-publisher agreements. It is good to be an attorney working in the information age.  Thank you Norbert Wiener, father of cybernetics, and patron saint of information workers everywhere.   

Conclusion

In order to launch a subscription service offering downloads or streaming books, in addition to entering into terms of service agreements with subscribers, Amazon must obtain rights from publishers.  Amazon and its publisher partners need to start negotiating the contours of an acceptable download and cloud based subscription service.  It is, after all, under both contract and copyright law, the right thing to do.

If you want a snap shot of subscriber terms gathered from allied industries, click here and scroll down about half-way down the page.  Looking at it, what's clear to me is that the new metric of an eBook’s financial success is not just the number of books purchased and stored on devices, but revenue from advertising and other sources.  It's about monetizing readers.    


Tuesday, September 13, 2011

Amazon Subscription Service Will Rewrite Book Contracts


The Economics of Book Publishing Just Changed Big Time

“[T]he dirty little secret of the media industry is that content aggregators,
not content creators, have long been the overwhelming
source of value creation.” 
--  Jonathan A. Knee, The Atlantic

It comes as no surprise that Amazon is exploring a Netflix-like subscription service for digital books. But what might Amazon's subscription book service actually look like for subscribers, authors and publishers?  And how will the definition of “Subscription Revenue” impact authors and publishers financially?   I believe how Amazon and the "Big Six" ultimately define the term "Subscription Revenue" will be the subject the next great digital book debate.  Subscription book services are on the march. They make sense for both publishers and readers for reasons discussed in an earlier post.  But with regard to authors, what their financial rewards will be is cloudy.  A royalty based on subscription revenue is a complex formula, and what trickles down to the author, ultimately, will be defined by both the Subscription Revenue definition hacked out of Amazon and the Big Six, and pre-internet author-publisher agreements that may not have contemplated this new business model.  .  

Below is a snap shot of subscriber terms gathered from allied industries which was compiled for a digital rights publishing course I taught at New York University this summer.  Looking at it, what's clear to me is that the new metric of an eBook’s financial success is not just the number of books purchased and stored on devices, but revenue from advertising and other sources.  It's about monetizing readers.    

In order to launch a subscription service offering downloads or streaming books, in addition to entering into terms of service agreements with subscribers, Amazon must obtain rights from publishers.  In this blog, I intentionally sidestep the rights issues in order to focus on the term “Subscription Revenue.”  

In book publishing, Net Revenue generally means gross proceeds from defined revenue streams minus enumerated expenses.   However, only a portion of subscription revenues will actually be attributable to subscription fees for downloads and streaming of books.   The obvious sources of revenue that make up the subscription revenue stream will include advertising and sale of information about subscribers. What percentage of advertising revenue attributable to a particular book is fair or reasonable?   If anyone is able to negotiate a viable Internet music-style (not Netflix) subscription model, it’s Amazon.   My best is on them..  Subsidiary issues then become the mechanics for ensuring the accuracy of reporting, which no doubt will be challenged.  

With regard to Jonathan Knee's assertion that content is no longer king (see the above epigram), I'm not convinced.  Cable television, which is a classic subscription model, suffers from annual rate increases because cable companies are at the mercy of their content providers.   As such, provided publishers negotiate wisely, Amazon will be a most excellent partner. 

Here's the comparison of business models prepared by Adam Ness for my NYU class:      

Compare Subscription Business Models

  • Service-Subscriber Terms
    • Unlimited content model
      • In exchange for a periodic fee, the subscriber receives access via streaming to unlimited content.
      • Examples
        • Netflix[i]: Unlimited on-demand streaming of movies and television shows for $8/month.
        • Rhapsody[ii]: Unlimited on-demand streaming of music for $10/month.
        • Sesame Street[iii]: Unlimited e-books accessed via a computer or “widget” for $4/month. 
        • Disney Digital Books[iv]:  Unlimited e-books accessed via a computer or iPad app for $9/month or $80/year.
      • Advantages
        • Many consumers like the idea of unlimited content.
        • The consumer can become tied to the service because if the consumer discontinues the service they lose access to their content.
        • In the book context, there may be less interest in retaining a copy of an e-book than there may be in retaining a copy of a particular song, so consumers may especially be drawn to an unlimited content e-book subscription model.
      • Disadvantages
        • Consumers may not like the idea of paying for something that gives them nothing to keep permanently.
    • Bundled content model
      • In exchange for a periodic fee, the subscriber receives a pre-determined number of downloads which become the member’s to keep.
      • Examples
        • Audible[v]: 1 downloaded audiobook per month for $15/month or 12 downloaded audiobooks per year for $150/year; 2 downloaded audiobooks per month for $23/month or 24 downloaded audiobooks per year for $230/year.
      • Advantages
        • Subscribers are able to keep their content. 
        • The content can be played/viewed on more devices.
        • Internet connection is not required to play/view content.
      • Disadvantages
        • Consumers have less incentive to continue their service because they can keep the content they downloaded.
        • Consumers may be interested in a limited number of works, and once they have downloaded them all they can cancel their subscription.
        • License fees may be higher for this type of service because it competes with the e-book market instead of being complementary to it.
    • Hybrid model
      • Combination of unlimited online content and either a limited number of downloads or discounted downloads.
      • Examples
        • Napster[vi]:  Unlimited on-demand streaming music on computer and home theater devices for $4-5 per month (depending on length of commitment); adding streaming on mobile devices doubles the price.  With the mobile plan, the member can save up to 100 songs on their phone for off-line listening (access to the saved songs is discontinued if the plan is cancelled).
        • Safari Books[vii]: Online access to 10 books per month for $23/month or $253/year; or unlimited e-books access via a computer for $43/month or $473/year.  Members also get 5 download tokens per month which can be used to download PDF versions of books.
      • Advantages
        • “Best of both worlds”

  • Service-Copyright Owner Terms

    • License for a term
      • Negotiate the license for unlimited use of the works within the service for a set term.
      • Netflix reportedly negotiated 3-4 year terms with film studios
      • Advantages
        • More predictable because the fees paid to the copyright owners will not fluctuate based on access.
      • Disadvantages
        • The service has limited bargaining power when it comes time to renew the license.
        • Licenses for new works can be costly.
    • Per-download/per-access license
      • The copyright owner is paid a fee each time his or her work is downloaded or access.
      • On-demand music streaming services account for the songs they play and pay the Performing Rights Organizations accordingly.
      • Advantages
        • Less commitment up-front.
        • Allows the marketplace to determine the value of a work, which can be a negotiating chip with the copyright owner.
      • Disadvantages
        • Service runs the risk of an unpredicted high rate of access, and could potentially operate at a loss if the access fees exceed the membership fees.
          • This is risk is more limited with a bundled content model because members can only access a certain number of works


[i] http://www.netflix.com
[ii] http://www.rhapsody.com
[iii] http://ebooks.sesamestreet.org
[iv] http://disneydigitalbooks.go.com
[v] http://www.audible.com
[vi] http://www.napster.com
[vii] http://www.safaribooksonline.com

Related CopyLaw articles:

Will Amazon Launch a Cloud Based Book Service?

How the Cloud, Expensive Hardcovers, Free eBooks & Windowing Can Save the Big Six

Amazon's New Imprint: Publishers Should be Scared. Very Scared.

I want to thank attorney Adam Ness, a former Master of Law Intern at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,  for his assistance in research involving subscription models in allied industries. 
Friday, May 6, 2011

Amazon’s New Imprint: Publishers Should be Scared. Very Scared.

The publishing industry was shaken the week of May 1 2011 by news that Amazon intends to use its enviable market power to launch another new publishing imprint.

Traditionally, book selling was separated from publishing, with booksellers (including Amazon)
realizing the benefit of combining the wares of many publishers. Now that Amazon has the ability to perform all of the activities that take place between delivery of an edited manuscript and delivery of finished books to readers, the publishing industry needs to take a long hard look at its current business model, and, start boning up on antitrust law.

As early as 2008, Amazon was actively going after new product and readers. However, at that time, it was self-published authors via what was then called Createspace, not Andrew Wylie's franchise authors.  It was clear in 2008, that if you coveted virtual shelf space at Amazon, they could lock you out if they adopted a strategy of favoring their books over your books.  

Once a Bully Always a Bully?

On May 8, 2008, in response to Amazon's threat to disable a book’s “Buy Now” button if that book’s publisher did not subscribe to Book Surge Print --Amazon's print on demand service-- I wrote an cautionary article for the New York Center for Independent Publishing, in which I posed the following question:What if Amazon determines that it is profoundly profitable to publish their own books?
 
Amazon's Book Surge gambit showed their hand, and, in an instant, the digital publishing landscape changed forever. As chair of the Center for Independent Publishing, I mused that "If Amazon does not use its great size and ability to bring its own books to the attention of readers, we will be very surprised."

We Don't Sell Books, We Aggregate Customer Data

It's no surprise that Amazon is not afraid to use its market power.  In the recent past we saw Amazon remove thousands of "buy" buttons from books published by Macmillan over a dust up on ebook prices.  Placing excessive control of content and distribution in the hands of one company -- whether Amazon or Google --- does nothing to promote the marketplace of ideas.   Unlike trade publishers, Amazon is data driven.  Like Google, they have the ability to monetize readers' information.  Amazon reads its customers like a book.   The key takeaway is that there is a real tension between the interests of Amazon and book publishers in general.   If Amazon strays from its core business of selling books, and offers free content to readers in exchange for advertising or subscription revenue the value of literature will be devalued.

As I wrote in an earlier post, keep your eyes on the Amazon Cloud Player, it's so-called music locker, as well as the advertising supported version of the Kindle.  Both are new platforms designed  to collect revenue by monetizing consumers - NOT just selling books.

If you are a stakeholder in the sale of physical books, you have to be concerned about what Amazon is doing in the clouds.  Is music a false analogy?   Perhaps, but the profound changes in the music business, has led them, and perhaps Amazon, too, that uploading music to a secure server (rather than digital downloads) is that industry's panacea .  Ten year into the digital transition, 50% of music sales are physical, and 50%digital.  It took fiction publishers only two years to get to where the music industry got in a decade.  Ebook sales are increasing geometrically - not arithmetically.   Technology is about access.  Copyright is about ownership and control.  Faster and cheaper trumps bricks and mortar.     

Keep the customer happy (a cloud book service allows readers to read digitally on multiple devices -- it's device agnostic) is Amazon's mantra.   They make selecting and  purchasing books convenient.  All good from a reader's perspective.  However, they have been complicit in devaluing literature, which could (if books were their core business), be a real concern for Amazon.  I suspect it isn't.                 

Legacy publishers need to look to the law and policies surrounding the delivery of digital content.  Perhaps, hire publicists and lobbyists to play the antitrust and reader privacy cards.

Imagine.  If Amazon's business model shifts from selling books to  monetizing readers, what is the real cost readers will pay for free (or low cost) content?   Answer:   Reader privacy.   A chilling thought worthy of a bumper sticker subsidized by the AAP.   The "P" in "pbook" Stands for Privacy."      

Reports from the field are that bookstores are becoming book showrooms, with customers browsing the shelves in person, but, buying online.  If Amazon owns the customer data, and favors their own books over your books, they are your competitor, not your partner.  So, what do you do about it?  Discuss among yourselves.
 
Related Posts

 

Monday, July 26, 2010

The Electronic Rights Dilemna

What Jerry Garcia & Ted Turner Can Teach the Publishing Industry

A Legal Footnote to the Andrew Wylie E-Book Controversy

Penguin R
andom House has its own self to blame for the electronic pickle they find
themselves in today. When drafting the original, pre-internet, publishing contracts for Cheever, Nabokov and Updike, they left out the future technology clauses.  To be clear, it's not that they didn't know how to draft future technology clauses.  They left them out.   As such, they just weren't thinking much about the future.  Likely, they were doing what was expedient, i.e., signing up books in "book form."  

What Was Random House (Not) Thinking?

As early as 1909, publishing attorneys have been thinking about e-books.  In 1909, they even included a "future technologies" clause in Mark Twain's publishing contract for his soon-to-be published (as in 2010) autobiography.  The "future technologies” clause, which acts as a catch-all for technologies and media not yet invented, has been around for a long while.  Narrowly drafted (out of respect for the author's rights and the publisher's legitimate interests), such a clause would have snagged verbatim e-book reading rights.

What the Publishing Industry Can Learn from Captain Trips & Captain Outrageous

What once seemed trivial (i.e., drafting a contract clause), is now upsetting the balance of power in the publishing industry.  It's a classic case of an ounce of prevention.   Happily, America has a long history of entrepreneurs taking undervalued opportunities (e.g., Turner's purchase of the old -- much undervalued -- MGM/UA film library in 1986) and leveraging them to create great value.

There's a Jerry Garcia/Phil Lesh/Robert Hunter lyric that neatly sums it up:  "One man gathers what another man spills” That was Turner's modus operandi, when he acquired the pre-1986 MGM, and pre-1950 Warner movie libraries.  He dusted them off, colorized them, and started profitable new media ventures.   He looked for and found undervalued opportunities and created great value. That's the American way.  Is Andrew Wylie a latter day Ted Turner?  Is he creating value or merely nibbling away -- unfairly -- at Random's backlist?  You be the judge.